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FOREIGN AFFAIRS: PRESIDENTIAL
INITIATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL
CONTROL
David P. Currie

*

THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. By H. Jefferson Powell.

IN

Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 2002. Pp. xvii, 165. $30.
Jefferson Powell1 is one of our foremost scholars of constitutional
history. He is particularly adept at bringing extrajudicial sources to
bear on constitutional issues. Owing perhaps in part to his extensive
service in the Department of Justice, he has a special facility for the
use of executive materials; h� is surely our leading academic expert on
executive interpretation of the Constitution.
In his latest book Professor Powell applies his enviable skills to the
recurring, fundamental, and controversial question of the division of
authority between the President and Congress in the realm of foreign
affairs. As is always the case when he puts the modem equivalent of
pencil to paper, we are much the richer for his having done so.
The Constitution, Professor Powell reminds us, is strangely
uninformative with respect to foreign affairs (pp. 19-21). The
President is given authority to receive foreign ambassadors and (with
the Senate's consent) both to appoint our own and to make treaties;
he is made Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Congress has
power to raise and support armies and navies, to declare war, and to
regulate foreign commerce, and it has the power of the purse. Beyond
these fragments nothing is said about who is responsible for deter
mining foreign policy.
The great Professor Edward Corwin, perceiving all this, threw up
his hands. The Constitution, he concluded, did not answer the
question whether Congress or the President had general responsibility
for foreign affairs; it extended to the two branches "an invitation to
struggle" for primacy in the field.2 Professor Powell disagrees: the
Constitution does answer the qt;iestion. It gives the President general
·

* Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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2. P. 4.; EDWARD s. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT- OFFICE AND POWERS 200 (1940); see
at 26, 29, 93, 199, 304-05.
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authority to formulate and implement foreign policy, and it gives
Congress power to block most Presidential initiatives (pp. xiv-xv, 95,
108-13, 139-40, 146). In other words, it leaves most questions respect
ing foreign relations to the political process, which in Professor
Powell's view is precisely where they belong (pp. xvi, 146, 149).
In the domestic sphere, as Justice Black made clear in the Steel
Seizure Case, there is no doubt that it is Congress that is supposed to
determine national policy; it is the President's job to carry it out.3 This
high-school-civics understanding of the separation of powers is
confirmed, as Justice Black wrote, by the juxtaposition of Articles I
and II of the Constitution, which vest legislative and executive
authority in Congress and the President respectively. It is no secret
that, as the Curtiss-Wright opinion insisted, foreign affairs do not fit
the usual pattern - with regard to either federalism or the separation
of powers.4 As Powell tells us, nothing in the Steel Seizure Case casts
any shadow on this conclusion; the whole point of Justice Jackson's
concurrence (and I would add, of Justice Black's Court opinion) was
that the case did not involve foreign affairs (p. 24).
True to his own model of scholarship, Professor Powell does not
stop with sparse and inconclusive judicial pronouncements on the
breadth of presidential authority over international relations; he goes
back to the beginning. The debates of the Constitutional Convention,
as he says, provide little assistance, and those of the state ratifying
conventions are no better; the delegates had other issues on their
minds (pp. 22, 31). The Federalist, on the other hand, he finds sugges
tive: in discussing the treaty power, in particular, Publius stressed the
necessity for unity, expedition, and confidentiality5 and the compara
tive advantage of the Executive in providing them.
But the centerpiece of Professor Powell's argument is his convinc
ing demonstration, largely from executive materials, that a political
rainbow of the most important members of the founding generation including George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison, and John Marshall - agreed in reading the
Constitution to give the President broad authority to take the initia
tive in foreign affairs. After a flurry of debate, for example, the early

3. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). Professor Powell
rightly notes that over the years Justice Jackson's more nuanced concurring opinion has
been more popular with scholars than Black's "opinion of the Court," p. 24, but for me
Black captured a basic truth about the primacy ·of legislative responsibility for domestic pol
icy that the later Supreme Court, malgre its protestations, seems to have recognized once
again in the so-called item-veto case, Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
4. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Professor Powell is
of course right that Curtiss-Wright actually held only that a particular delegation of authority
to the President was constitutional. P. 23.
5. Pp. 31-34; see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15, 31, 70, 72, 84 ( Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 3,
4, 64 (John Jay), Nos. 41, 45 (James Madison).
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Congress left it to President Washington to determine to which
countries diplomatic officers should be appointed, and all his advisers
thought Congress was right to do so (pp. 43-47). In their celebrated
debate over Washington's audacious Neutrality Proclamation, both
Hamilton and Madison agreed that the President enjoyed broad
authority over foreign relations; Madison's only concern was that
Washington might have trespassed upon Congress's exclusive author
ity to declare war (pp. 48-51). In the famous controversy over the Jay
Treaty, President Washington defied a demand by the House of
Representatives for his instructions to Chief Justice Jay on the ground
that foreign affairs were none of the House's business, and the House
did nothing to enforce its demand (pp. 66� 76). In defending what
opponents attacked as presidential interference with judicial pro
ceedings respecting the extradition of Jonathan Robbins, Marshall, in
an 1800 speech even his adversaries praised to the skies, insisted that
the question whether to extradite an alleged fugitive was committed to
the Executive and that the entire subject of foreign intercourse had
been placed in presidential hands (pp. 79-88). In short, Professor
Powell concludes, "Washington and his associates and immediate
successors" all agreed that "the president determines, at least as an
initial matter, what the foreign policy of the United States is to be" relying in part upon the textual argument that this authority was
embraced within the "executive Power" vested in him by Article II
and in part upon the functional argument, previously adumbrated in
the Federalist, of the "need for an effective system of making and
implementing foreign policy" (pp. 93-94).
Insofar as this message concerns three of the four central compo
nents of foreign policy that Professor Powell defines for us in a much
appreciated appendix (pp. 152-55)
recognition, negotiation, and the
confidentiality of diplomatic information - I should think it rather
difficult to take issue with his conclusions. As he says, his basic thesis
appears to find support in the text, in the original understanding, in
early constitutional practice, in "its fit with the necessary institutional
relations between the political branches," and in "the consequences
which it entails" (p. 30). Indeed qne is tempted, if that is all there is to
foreign affairs, to protest that the ostensible silences of the Framers
are largely illusory: recognition is implicit in the decision whether to
receive ambassadors, negotiation in treatymaking, and confidentiality
in the activity to be concealed.
There is, however, a fourth �l�ment in Professor Powell's concep
tion of foreign affairs: the protection of national security. It is a grave
mistake, he argues, to treat the allocation of authority over military
matters as analytically distinct from that over foreign relations:
"[Q]uestions about the locus of authority over national security and
the use of the armed forces should start not froin 'clause-bound inter
pretation' of particular constitutional provisions, but from an overall
-
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understanding of the Constitution of foreign affairs" (p. 154). And
that understanding, Professor Powell contends, leads to the conclusion
that "the president has a constitutional responsibility, independent of
any act of Congress[,] to preserve the physical safety and international
interests of the United States against foreign threat" (p. 154).
It is here, I believe, that Professor Powell's thesis will encounter
the greatest resistance. For he acknowledges, as his treatment of
Madison's position on the Neutrality Act suggests, that the war powers
present a special case (pp. 51, 93, 139). It could hardly be otherwise.
Powell agrees that the explicit and substantial powers granted to
Congress in this field qualify the President's general authority over
foreign affairs - as Justice Jackson, whose Steel Seizure opinion he
especially admires, insisted they qualified the "clause-bound" author
ity of the Commander in Chief. As usual, however, the devil is in the
details, and Professor Powell seems willing to concede the President
greater competence to initiate or risk hostilities than some of us may
think consistent with the constitutional plan.
His bottom line, though hedged about with hints of serious defini
tional controversy, should command wide assent: "If the anticipated or
actual severity, scope or duration of hostilities rises to the level of
'war' in a constitutional sense, congressional authorization is constitu
tionally necessary" (p. 139). For he agrees, as he must, that the clause
giving Congress authority to declare war "sets some sort of outer
boundary on the president's ability to use the commander in chief
power to pursue sheerly executive-branch policies" (p. 121). He rightly
adverts in this connection to "founding-era concern about unilateral
presidential power to involve the United States in war" (p. 121) and to
the deliberate decision of the Framers to transfer to Congress signifi
cant war powers that in England had belonged to the King.6 He does
not make the unsustainable claim that the President is free to wage
war at will so long as he does not formally declare it.
Mr. Powell's claim of presidential authority is more modest. "The
ability to warn of, or threaten, the use of military force is an ordinary
and essential element in the toolbox of that branch of government
empowered to formulate and implement foreign policy," he argues,
and the threat of force would be hollow if its implementation
"depended in every instance on congressional approval" (p. 119).
Thus:

6. P. 113; see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69 ( Alexander Hamilton); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392,
397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) ("We have already given in example one effectual check to
the Dog of war by transferring the power .of letting him loose from the Executive to the
Legislative body . . .. ).
"
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the argument that military action must always be authorized in advance
by Congress is erroneous, and not only in those circumstances in which
the president is responding to a direct attack on the United States ....
If Congress provides the president with the wherewithal, and if Con
gress leaves the president legally unfettered, the president has the prima
facie power to employ military force in the pursuit of foreign policy ob
jectives.(pp. 119-20)

Congress's sweeping powers to deny the President the necessary
resources and restrict the purposes for which they may be used take
much of the sting out of this conclusion; Professor Powell insists that
Congress, if it chooses, may have the last word (pp. 120-21).
Otherwise, he argues, in accord with an opinion of the Office of Legal
Counsel respecting the dispatch of armed forces to Haiti in 1994,
the question of presidential authority is one of degree: "The use of
military force is a tool of foreign policy, but at some point of severity,
it implicates the American people in a fashion that demands the
approval of their elected legislators as well as their elected president."7
Those who recall the strenuous argument over congressional and
presidential war powers during the Vietnam controversy may perhaps
be forgiven if they question Mr. Powell's conclusion as to where to
draw the line. For it was common currency at the time, and has
remained so ever since, to understand the familiar decision of the
Constitutional Convention to authorize Congress to "declare war"
rather than to "make war" as drawing a distinction between defensive
and aggressive action. That is indeed how it was explained by Madison
and Elbridge Gerry, who proposed it: the Executive should be permit
ted (and who would dispute it?) "to repel sudden attacks."8 It is true,
as Professor Powell points out, that Roger Sherman is reported as
having doubted that the terminology they proposed would do the trick
(p. 116), but that seems to me not to leave the Framers' intentions
quite so murky as the author depicts them (pp. 116-17).
To sustain his rejection of· Madison and Gerry's distinction,
Professor Powell again relies heavily on early practice, the relevance
of which I should be the last to deny.9 There may nevertheless be
room for disagreement as to the l�ssons that practice imparts.

7. P. 122; see 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 173, 179 (1994).
8. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966).
9. From the beginning the Supreme Court has relied on early practice as evidence of
what the Constitution means. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 (1
Wheat.) U.S. 304, 351-52 (1816). That does not mean, of course, that the early practice was
never mistaken. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803) (rejecting the
First Congress's apparent interpretation of the Article III provision respecting the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction).
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Professor Powell's historical case for presidential authority to risk
or initiate hostilities rests essentially on two early examples: efforts to
enforce President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation and
President Jefferson's attempts to deal with the notorious Barbary
pirates. 10 Both are of first importance to anyone who wishes to under
stand the war powers, and I shall say a few words about each of them.
After warning that he would prosecute those who offended
American neutrality by supporting French war efforts in the conflict
that followed that country's Revolution (on the debatable premise
that international laws were among those whose execution the
President was expected to ensure and at the arguable expense of
poaching on congressional authority to define offenses against the law
of nations), Washington directed the Governors of the several states
to stop them (raising interesting questions of his authority to employ
the militia to execute the laws without, so far as appears, complying
with the formalities prescribed by the governing statute). Then, when
the Little Sarah was all fitted out and ready to sail in defiance of the
Proclamation, the Cabinet - in Washington's absence - agreed he
had power to use force to detain the ship, and the President issued
orders requiring the Governors to do just that in future cases (pp. 5359).

I do not believe it can be said that this revealing incident suggests a
consensus within the Administration that the President had general
authority to formulate and execute foreign policy; each step in the
saga appears to follow logically from Washington's initial decision that
he had a specific duty to enforce the law of nations. It does seem to
demonstrate, however, that both the President and his Cabinet
thought neither Congress's war powers nor the concerns that lay
behind them precluded the Executive under the circumstances from
using force against a vessel in the service of a foreign nation - and
not merely, Professor Powell emphasizes, when it acted in self-defense
(pp. 57, 60-61).
The second incident is more quickly told: President Jefferson
risked war by sending Navy vessels to protect United States shipping
in the Mediterranean and (contrary to what he told Congress in asking
for authority to retaliate) ordered aggressive action against Tripoli in
response to its declaration of war (pp. 91-93).

10. He also invokes Jefferson's hard-nosed conduct toward France in pursuit of his
policy of keeping French troops off the Mississippi River, pp. 90, 119, which included the
threat of a United States alliance with Great Britain. Like President Monroe when he issued
his famous edict against European intervention in the New World, Jefferson was plainly
playing with fire, as was President Polk in his later belligerent posture toward the British
with respect to Oregon. In none of these instances, however, do I recall any suggestion that
the President thought he had authority actually to initiate hostilities without congressional
approval.
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Of these two incidents, that of the Little Sarah strikes me as the
more damaging to the conventional distinction between offensive and
defensive action. Yes, the President was simply enforcing the law of
nations, which (on his assumption that it was one of the laws he was
supposed to enforce) was mere fulfillment of his explicit constitutional
outy. Yet in so doing he came perilously near to employing armed
force against a sovereign nation, which looks very much like initiating
war. And that grave step, the popular theory assures us, may be taken
only by Congress. I I
Jefferson's actions against Tripoli seem far easier to reconcile with
the traditional distinction. To begin with, what he told Congress was a
classic exposition of that theory: only Congress, he argued, might
authorize anything beyond self-defense - even in retaliation for an
alleged attack on the United States Navy. What Jefferson said may be
more important than what he did, for it suggests he thought the
country would not accept a broader interpretation of presidential
power. In addition, even his actions conformed to the essence of that
principle, which Hamilton himself in his attack on Jefferson's self
denying message accepted: only Congress may initiate martial conflict.
When Jefferson sent ships to the Mediterranean it was for strictly de
fensive purposes; surely the power to protect American shipping in
cludes authority to move men-of-war into positions where they can re
spond to actual attacks.12 And when his commanders finally took
aggressive action it was in reply to the enemy's declaration of war raising questions only of the extent of presidential authority to re
spond to foreign aggression, not of Congress's monopoly on initiating
offensive action.
But my principal reservation about Professor Powell's use of
history with respect to presidential war powers is its selectivity. For
there are a surprising number of early extrajudicial precedents on the
subject, many of which go unmentioned. And although the later
history, as the Fulbright Committee graphically demonstrated, reveals
a disturbing drift of warmaking authority from Congress to the

11. It should be noted that President Jefferson took no such step in the later and more
famous case of the British attack on the Chesapeake but soberly referred the question of re
prisals to Congress, although it was a plain case of self-defense, saying that the decision
"[w]hether the outrage is a proper cause of war" was one "belonging exclusively to Con
gress." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William H. Cabell (June 29, 1807), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 432, 433 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905); DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 126-27, 147
(2001) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS].
12. Compare President Polk's dispatch of troops to what he considered the Texas bor
der in the face of the obvious risk (which became reality) of provoking a Mexican attack.
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM,
1845-1861, at ch. 2 (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter CURRIE, DESCENT INTO THE
MAELSTROM].
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Executive,13 the bulk of the early material tells quite another story.
Moreover, even on those rare occasions when early Presidents
arguably did initiate hostilities against foreign powers, they almost
invariably argued that they were acting either defensively or to carry
out some legislative command.
The Tripolitan incident, I have suggested, was a part of this tradi
tion. So was President Washington's earlier explicit refusal, on consti
tutional grounds, to send troops to fight troublesome Indians on the
Georgia frontier: only Congress, he told the importunate Governor,
could empower him to take offensive action. Similarly, when Andrew
Jackson, in pursuit of marauding Seminole Indians who had taken
refuge beyond the border, took possession of Spanish forts in Florida,
President Monroe emphatically disowned him: not even the President
could lawfully commit an act of war against a foreign state. The
belligerent Monroe Doctrine, warning European powers to keep their
hands off the Western Hemisphere, was attacked as usurping
congressional authority by creating a risk of war; Monroe's successor
defended it on the ground that in reiterating the Doctrine he had
neither the competence nor the intention to commit the United States
to war. On similar grounds President Tyler refused to promise to
defend Texas before its annexation, and President Fillmore refused to
defend Hawaii or Santo Domingo. President Madison asserted that he
was following congressional orders in occupying West Florida,
President Polk that Mexico had invaded the state of Texas. President
Pierce employed force in Greytown against what he dismissed as a
band of private adventurers, not a sovereign nation; President
Buchanan pleaded for congressional support with the assertion that he
could not so much as fire a gun to protect American interests abroad
without congressional sanction. There were occasional exceptions,14
but the pattern seems clear: the President might make warning noises
that risked war, but the official position down to the Civil War was
that only Congress could initiate hostilities against a foreign power.
Against this array of precedent, the Little Sarah incident seems to me
to pale considerably. However President Washington and his advisers
may have justified the dangers of war they were prepared to assume in
that case, it cannot in my opinion outweigh the abundance of early
authority against presidential initiation of actual hostilities.

13.

See S.

REP. No. 90-797 (1967).

14. President Pierce sent the Navy to Panama to enforce perceived American rights, and
President Fillmore authorized reprisals against the authorities of the island of Johanna, in
the Indian Ocean. These and the other incidents noted in the text are discussed in DAYID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 55115, 172-238 (1997); CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 11, at 123-55, 191-218; and
CURRIE, DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, supra note 12, at chs. 2-3.
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Toward the end of·his book Professor Powell speaks briefly to a
collage of specific issues regarding the allocation of power over
foreign affairs - including the War Powers Resolution, the role of the
courts in interpreting the relevant law, the effect of executive agree
ments, and the locus of authority to terminate treaties (pp. 122-38).
Granting that the main purpose of this slim volume lies elsewhere, one
may still regret that he did not expand his treatment of some of these
topics ever so slightly. In the discussion of treaty abrogation by statute
or by unilateral executive action, for example, I miss acknowledgment
and evaluation of a third possibility suggested by the constitutional
text and both practiced and defended in the mid-nineteenth century
controversy over a commercial convention· with Denmark: that
treaties are to be unmade, as they are made, by the President with the
Senate's consent.15 Similarly, in connection with executive agreements,
I should have been pleased to encounter a reminder that the require
ment that treaties be endorsed by an extraordinary Senate majority,
like the vesting of war powers in Congress, was a considered and
deliberate restriction of presidential authority. Finally, while I agree
with much that Professor Powell has to say about the War Powers
Resolution, I would not have dismissed so quickly the provision
requiring the President to withdraw military forces on congressional
command as an obvious violation of the rule against legislative vetoes
established in INS v. Chadha.16 For as I understand the record of the
Constitutional Convention, the President's inherent power is essen
tially to prevent irreparable harm until Congress can make the policy
decision whether or not to wage war; the declaration of both Houses
that the President should desist, like a simple pronouncement that
Congress is ready to exercise its constitutional responsibility, may
arguably be enough to show that of its own force the President's
authority has expired.
If I have gone out of my way to find issues on which there may be
room to differ with Professor Powell's conclusions, that is not to
disparage but rather to underline the challenging nature of his book.
The President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs is an important contri
bution to a continuing debate, and one that deserves to be taken
seriously. It is not, like so much else in this highly charged field, a
mere polemic. It is a careful, knowledgeable, measured, thoughtful,
sure-footed, reliable, responsible, and even modest investigation of a
difficult question by a scholar who takes both law and history seriously
and for whom, as my colleagues of the Supreme Court Review once
admiringly wrote of the late Gerald Gunther, the Constitution is a

15.

See

CURRIE, DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, supra note 12, at ch. 1.

16. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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guide and not a tool.17 When I read Professor Powell's work, I invaria
bly learn something about our constitutional history I did not know,
and I see what I did know from a new perspective. Professor Powell
wastes neither words nor his readers' time, and he writes very well.
Anyone who has the slightest interest in his important subject should
read this book.
Professor Powell has since completed yet another study of consti
tutional history that has just been published.18 It is, if anything, even
more ambitious and challenging than the present volume, and the
inquiring reader would be well advised to scarf it up as well.

17. See p. ix. Professor Powell purports to give us not a definitive answer to the question
of presidential power but "only the best answer" based upon legal and historical evidence. P.
5.

18. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORY AND POLITICS (2002).

